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Abstract. This article discusses aspects of communication
architecture for early warning systems (EWS) in general and
gives details of the speciﬁc communication architecture of
an early warning system against tsunamis. While its sen-
sors are the “eyes and ears” of a warning system and en-
able the system to sense physical effects, its communica-
tion links and terminals are its “nerves and mouth” which
transport measurements and estimates within the system and
eventually warnings towards the affected population. De-
signing the communication architecture of an EWS against
tsunamis is particularly challenging. Its sensors are typically
very heterogeneous and spread several thousand kilometers
apart. They are often located in remote areas and belong
to different organizations. Similarly, the geographic spread
of the potentially affected population is wide. Moreover, a
failure to deliver a warning has fatal consequences. Yet, the
communication infrastructure is likely to be affected by the
disaster itself. Based on an analysis of the criticality, vul-
nerability and availability of communication means, we de-
scribe the design and implementation of a communication
systemthatemploysbothterrestrialandsatellitecommunica-
tionlinks. Webelievethatmanyoftheissuesweencountered
during our work in the GITEWS project (German Indonesian
Tsunami Early Warning System, Rudloff et al., 2009) on the
design and implementation communication architecture are
also relevant for other types of warning systems. With this
article, we intend to share our insights and lessons learned.
Correspondence to: M. Angermann
(michael.angermann@dlr.de)
1 Introduction
“The objective of people-centred early warning
systems is to empower individuals and communi-
ties threatened by hazards to act in sufﬁcient time
and in an appropriate manner to reduce the possi-
bility of personal injury, loss of life and damage to
property and the environment”.
Source: United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (UN-ISDR, 2006a).
The 2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake triggered a dev-
astating tsunami along coastlines of the Indian Ocean. The
unbearable large number of casualties caused by this tsunami
motivated a major effort to implement a novel warning sys-
tem. In order to signiﬁcantly reduce the number of casualties
caused by future events, this warning system would help to
evacuate affected regions by providing timely warnings.
This warning system would be equipped with a host of
sensorsandadecisionsupportsystembasedonlatestseismo-
logical expertise, bathymetry and detailed information about
the coastlines to deliver adequate and timely warnings to
each affected individual (Fig. 1). In its essence, such an
early warning system uses measurements of physical effects,
such as vibration or pressure to infer about the possibility
and severity of a tsunami and to derive the measures that are
likely to minimize the number of casualties.
For this purpose sensors are used to obtain measurements
of the physical effects. Due to the fact that the physical
phenomena of earthquakes and possible tsunamis are spread
over very large ranges, the sensors to measure them have to
be deployed over very large regions. The process of infer-
ring about the actual state of the world, such as whether an
earthquake has caused a tsunami, needs to take all relevant
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physical effects (vibration, pressure,…)
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Fig.1. InitsveryessenceaTsunamiWarningsystemconvertsphys-
ical effects related to a Tsunami, such as vibration or pressure to
adequate and timely warnings and advice to individuals.
measurements into account. Therefore, these measurements
have to be reliably transmitted to a location where this au-
tomated or semi-automated inference process is happening.
Figure 2 depicts a generic model for the “convergent” section
of a warning system that is responsible for collecting and de-
livering sensor data to a central alert or warning center. A
more detailed discussion of this part in GITEWS is given in
Sect. 3.
Once decisions about the warning levels and the regions
that should be warned are made, the warnings have to be send
to the individuals in these supposedly affected regions. The
UN- ISDR checklist (see references) for developing early
warning systems lists four prerequisites for effective warn-
ing:
– “Communication and dissemination systems tailored to
the needs of individual communities (e.g. radio or tele-
vision for those with access; and sirens, warning ﬂags
or messenger runners for remote communities).”
– “Warning communication technology reaches the entire
population, including seasonal populations and remote
locations.”
– “International organizations or experts consulted to as-
sist with identiﬁcation and procurement of appropriate
equipment.”
– “Multiple communication mediums used for warning
dissemination (e.g. mass media and informal commu-
nication).”
A generic model for the “divergent” section of warning sys-
temisgiveninFig.3. Itshowstheuseofmultipleanddiverse
channels to reach individuals that possess or are within reach
of various user devices. Section 5 discusses some general
aspects of this part.
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ered to individuals via multiple and diverse channels to maximize
the number of successfully warned persons.
2 Criticality and vulnerability
The effectiveness of an early warning system relies on the
tight integration of geographically distributed system com-
ponents such as sensors and warning center(s). As such, an
early warning system follows a distributed architecture. In
any distributed system a reliable communication infrastruc-
ture forms the backbone of this distributed architecture.
2.1 Primary tasks
In addition to the “hot” warning chain, efﬁcient online data
exchange, assistance and monitoring capabilities between
German andIndonesian partnersis essential duringthe build-
up and initial operational phases of the warning system.
Therefore, the communication infrastructure for GITEWS
has to fulﬁll three primary tasks:
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– First, sensor communication i.e.; measurement data
transport to the warning center(s) from the “ﬁeld”.
– Second, center-to-center communication, i.e. direct
communication between experts, between warning cen-
ters and/or development and testing sites.
– Third, last mile communication: transport warning and
alarms to the general public1.
2.2 Robustness of the internet
Most people ascribe a very high degree of robustness to the
Internet. Our daily experience with telephony and Internet
services that fail extremely rarely, apparently justiﬁes this
notion. In fact the Internet in general is surprisingly resis-
tant to partial failures. Following this argument, a warning
system’s communication could or even should be based on
the public Internet.
However, certain elements of the network are critical and
severe degradation or total loss of connectivity may occur if
they fail. The following description illustrates this vulnera-
bility (19 December 2008, Bloomberg):
“internet and telephone communications between
the Middle East and Europe were disrupted after
three undersea cables connecting Italy and Egypt
in the Mediterranean Sea were damaged.
The failures cut the ﬂow of “data of various kinds”
between Europe and the Middle East, and there’s
no timeframe for when communications will be re-
stored, said Sanjeev Gaur, director of assurance at
Reliance Globalcom Ltd. in India. France Telecom
SA, which plans to send a maintenance boat to ﬁx
the problem, said the situation should be back to
normal by 31 December.
Three cable systems carrying more than 75 per-
cent of trafﬁc between the Middle East, Europe and
America were damaged, according to the UK’s In-
teroute Plc, which operates a ﬁber- optic data net-
work connecting 92 cities. The cables run from
Alexandria in northern Egypt to Sicily in south-
ern Italy. In January, an anchor severed the ca-
bles outside Alexandria after bad weather condi-
tions forced ships to moor off the coast” (see also
references).
1Implementation of this third task was explicitly not part of the
authors’ tasks within the GITEWS project. Nevertheless a success-
ful system design needs to consider relevant aspects of this task
in order to understand the overall system functionality. Impor-
tant work on using sirens for alarming the general public has been
carried out by GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
within GITEWS – see also Spahn et al. (2010)
2.3 Robustness of Indonesian communication
infrastructure
Since the communication links of a warning system are abso-
lutely essential for its functioning, we analyze the vulnerabil-
ity of the existing communication infrastructure in Indonesia
in the following.
As part of the Early Warning and Mitigation System
(EWMS) in the framework of the German Indonesian –
Tsunami Early Warning System Project (GITEWS), several,
geographically distributed system components such as sen-
sors and warning centers are foreseen to closely collaborate
in real-time, thus forming a distributed architecture. To ful-
ﬁll the overall system’s mission, a reliable communication
infrastructure forms the backbone of this distributed archi-
tecture. Furthermore, it is considered necessary to provide
online data exchange, assistance and monitoring capabilities
between German and Indonesian partners during the build-
up and initial operational phases of the warning system. As
much as this capability is essential during the build-up phase,
it is important to remove any dependability on German assets
in the operational phase in order to achieve full autonomy of
the Indonesian authorities in operating the system.
Indonesian infrastructures, such as the electric grid, land-
line and sea-cables, switching centers or Internet exchanges
are by deﬁnition exposed to natural disaster occurring in or
around Indonesia. These infrastructures are potentially ei-
ther directly affected by the natural disaster or by resulting
cascading effects, such as failure of switching centers due to
power outage or overload due to increased public user de-
mand.
An exhaustive analysis of these effects and their depen-
dencies within the Indonesian infrastructures, in order to as-
sess their likely availability before, during and after a natural
disaster, would be an interesting and valuable undertaking.
However, it was neither considered to be feasible, nor within
the scope of the GITEWS project. Therefore, a more prag-
matic approach was necessary to assess whether the public
Internet could serve as a cost-efﬁcient and reliable commu-
nication backbone for the Early Warning and Mitigation Sys-
tem.
We therefore considered it meaningful to observe the re-
sponse of the Indonesian public Internet under conditions
that resemble the real operational conditions of the EWMS,
namely a very strong earthquake.
While, in general, it is fortunate, that natural disasters,
such as very strong earthquakes are rare events that occur
only several times in a decade or even century, this fact is
likely to prevent us from observing such strong earthquakes
within the time-window available for the design of the com-
munication infrastructure. Nevertheless, we have been moni-
toringpubliclyavailableEarthquakeinformationprovidedby
GFZ, German Research Centre for Geosciences and USGS
(United States Geological Survey) in order to trigger a ﬁrst
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Table 1. Relevant Earthquakes in the Indian Ocean region from 26 to 27 May.
Date Time Magnitude Location Region
2006-05-27 07:35:08 5.3 6.22◦ S 130.52◦ E Banda Sea
2006-05-27 04:21:57 4.7 8.14◦ S 110.30◦ E Java, Indonesia
2006-05-27 03:10:06 5.1 8.42◦ S 110.14◦ E Java, Indonesia
2006-05-26 22:54:02 5.8 8.04◦ S 110.43◦ E Java, Indonesia
Fig. 4. Sea cables available for communications to/from Indone-
sia. Source: Alcatel-Lucent, Worldmap of optical ﬁbre submarine
networks, 2007.
network analysis from hosts outside Indonesia with respect
to reachability of hosts inside Indonesia.
IndonesiahasmanysmallInternetserviceproviders(ISPs)
providing Dialup and DSL (digital subscriber line) connec-
tivity in many parts of the country. GSM (Global System
for Mobile Communications) mobile network operators offer
GPRS (General Packet Radio Services) based Internet Ac-
cess, too.
Although we lack exact data, we found only few major
carriers, namely Indosat, Satelindo, Telkom and cbn that pro-
vided access (“upstream”) to the core Internet at the begin-
ning of the project in 2005.
All providers hold sea-cable based links to locations all
over Indonesia and to Singapore (see Fig. 4). They also
hold a single satellite link to a Los Angeles based ISP called
CAIS.
Fig. 5. Map of Java with earthquake localized near Yogyakarta.
Source: GEOFON/GFZ Potsdam.
Empirical evidence
In 2005, there was a central Internet Exchange Point
OpenIXp.net linking some 100 local ISPs of Indonesia.
BMKG (Badan Meteorologi Klimatologi dan Geoﬁsika) was
connectedvia2DSLlineswith1.5Mbit/sintotal. Localtraf-
ﬁc included local internet access for employees, web-server
with public access and access to remote seismic networks.
We conducted an evaluation of the the reachability of In-
donesianhostsusing thefollowingtwo IP-addresses givenby
BMKG: 202.69.107.133 (gis.bmg.go.id) and 202.162.217.4
(intranet portal of BMKG). A notiﬁcation about an earth-
quake near Yogyakarta on 26 May 2006, had triggered us
to probe the reachability of these hosts.
Time, location and magnitude of this and following earth-
quakes in the Indian Ocean region had been determined by
the GeoFon network of GFZ and are given in Table 1 as well
as depicted on a map in Fig. 5.
Probing of the Internet connectivity was performed in
the morning, approximately 8h after the ﬁrst earthquake.
The probing has been performed using a standard tracer-
oute tool from three different hosts from within DFN
(Deutsches Forschungsnetz), a commercial ISP and from a
host in Singapore in order to provoke different routes. The
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Table2. TracedrouteoriginatingfromhostinOberpfaffenhofen, GermanywithinDFN(DeutschesForschungsnetz)towardshostatBMKG’s
Jakarta premises in Indonesia on 26 May, approx. 06:30UTC. The trace shows that the route is broken at the hop towards Indonesia, thus
rendering Indonesia unreachable from within DFN. A router in Los Angeles is the last reachable hop in this trace. For illustration purposes
the remainder of the route is added and marked red, based on a trace several weeks after the earthquake.
Hop Name IP address Delay pkt 1 Delay pkt 2 Delay pkt 3 Comment
1 cs123k1k-vl173.op. t-systems-sfr.com 129.247.173.254 0.161 ms 0.146 ms 0.138 ms DLR-Ober-pfaffenhofen
2 cs123k1e-7206.op. t-systems-sfr.com 172.16.5.89 1.233 ms 1.055 ms 0.611 ms DLR-Ober-pfaffenhofen
3 tul5.bih.t-systems-sfr.com 172.17.5.5 11.691 ms 11.865 ms 11.773 ms Birlinghoven
4 172.18.40.1 172.18.40.1 12.024 ms 12.478 ms 12.172 ms Birlinghoven
5 cs05ck1g.bih.t-systems-sfr.com 172.18.48.2 13.434 ms 13.246 ms 12.915 ms Birlinghoven
6 xr-bir1-ge8-2.x-win.dfn.de 188.1.43.45 12.820 ms 12.517 ms 12.738 ms Birlinghoven
7 xr-fra1-te3-2.x-win.dfn.de 188.1.145.46 15.164 ms 15.550 ms 15.420 ms Frankfurt
8 cr02.frf02.pccwbtn.net 80.81.192.50 15.578 ms 15.468 ms 15.151 ms
9 corporateaccess.ser6-0. cr01.lax03.pccwbtn.net 63.218.91.126 192.242 ms 191.908 ms 192.018 ms Los Angeles
10 63-216-78-3.sdsl.cais.net 63.216.78.3 189.060 ms 188.868 ms 188.758 ms
11 – – * * * likely sat routera
Route broken from here on. Remainder of trace added based on trace several weeks after earthquake for illustration.
12 63-216-78-66.sdsl.cais.net 63.216.78.66 595.968 ms 596.715 ms 595.004 ms likely sat router
13 202.69.96.50 202.69.96.50 616.371 ms 615.546 ms 617.720 ms not resolved
14 GW-JKT.DEMON.JASATEL.NET 202.69.96.226 620.912 ms 616.693 ms 612.860 ms Indonesia
15 214.217.iconpln.net.id 202.162.217.214 615.984 ms 612.096 ms 614.748 ms Indonesia
16 gis.bmg.go.id 202.69.107.133 624.606 ms 625.872 ms 627.330 ms Indonesia
a Satellite path delay is approximately 270 milliseconds (the time required for the signal to travel 35,800 km into space and return). If associated signal processing time through
baseband equipment is included, total path delay is closer to 320 milliseconds.
Table 3. Traced route originating from DE-CIX a commercial Internet Exchange of German ISPs towards host at BMKG’s Jakarta premises
in Indonesia on 26 May, approx. 06:30UTC. The trace shows that the route is broken at the hop towards Indonesia, thus rendering Indonesia
unreachable from commercial ISP networks. A router in Los Angeles is the last reachable hop in this trace. For illustration purposes the
remainder of the route is added and marked red, based on a trace several weeks after the earthquake.
Hop Name IP address Delay pkt 1 Delay pkt 2 Delay pkt 3 Comment
1 fragw.gatewayrouter.net 84.16.224.1 0.891 ms 0.629 ms 0.620 ms
2 fragw1.gatewayrouter.net 217.20.117.10 0.279 ms 0.229 ms 0.250 ms
3 cr02.frf02.pccwbtn.net 80.81.192.50 0.680 ms 0.783 ms 0.630 ms
4 corporateaccess.ser6-0. cr01.lax03.pccwbtn.net 63.218.91.126 176.450 ms 173.370 ms 174.652 ms
5 63-216-78-3.sdsl.cais.net 63.216.78.3 175.502 ms 176.128 ms 172.903 ms likely sat router
6 – – * * *
Route broken from here on. Remainder of trace added based on trace several weeks after earthquake for illustration.
7 63-216-78-66.sdsl.cais.net 63.216.78.66 566.217 ms 564.771 ms 558.930 ms likely sat router
8 202.69.96.50 202.69.96.50 493.803 ms 482.275 ms 492.839 ms not resolved
9 GW-JKT.DEMON.JASATEL.NET 202.69.96.226 485.346 ms 484.928 ms 503.168 ms Indonesia
10 214.217.iconpln.net.id 202.162.217.214 493.944 ms 486.860 ms 490.326 ms Indonesia
11 www.bmg.go.id 202.69.107.133 533.261 ms 538.869 ms 534.448 ms Indonesia
host (gis.bmg.go.id, 202.69.107.133) operated by BMKG in
Jakarta has been selected as endpoint of the traces. The re-
sulting traces are listed and annotated in the following three
Tables 2–4. While we were not able to determine the actual
mechanism that led to this interruption, this event hinted that
an earthquake may have detrimental effects on the commu-
nication infrastructure in Indonesia.
3 Sensor communication
DuetothelargenumberandwidespatialspreadofGITEWS’
sensors (seismic and GPS stations, tide gauges, and buoys)
the design, implementation and operation of the converging
segment of the warning chain (see Fig. 2 in Sect. 1) is partic-
ularly challenging. It became clear in a very early phase of
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Table 4. Traced route via Singapore (sea-cable operated by Singapore Telecom towards Indonesia) towards host at BMKG’s Jakarta premises
in Indonesia on 26 May, approx. 06:30UTC. The trace shows that the route is broken at the hop towards Indonesia, thus rendering Indonesia
unreachable from commercial ISP networks using this route. For illustration purposes the remainder of the route is added and marked red,
based on a trace several weeks after the earthquake.
Hop Name IP address Delay pkt 1 Delay pkt 2 Delay pkt 3
4 fa8-1-0.sinar3.Singapore.opentransit.net 193.251.128.209 2.882 ms 1.370 ms 1.758 ms
5 – – * * *
Route broken from here on. Remainder of trace added based on trace several weeks after earthquake for illustration.
6 202.93.46.113 202.93.46.113 13.471 ms 13.541 ms 13.281 ms
7 202.155.7.252 202.155.7.252 14.038 ms 14.013 ms 13.780 ms
8 202.155.137.18 202.155.137.18 14.798 ms 13.704 ms 13.337 ms
9 202.155.27.27 202.155.27.27 13.961 ms 21.561 ms 16.666 ms
10 Fe-2-1.int-core-noc.BORG.JASATEL.NET 202.69.96.213 17.588 ms 17.155 ms 16.278 ms
11 Ge-1-1.edge1-core-noc.ZEUS.JASATEL.NET 202.69.96.210 19.563 ms 18.199 ms 18.200 ms
12 Ge-1-1.Edge3-core-noc.ZOPE.JASATEL.NET 202.69.96.218 21.534 ms 17.486 ms 17.828 ms
13 GW-JKT.DEMON.JASATEL.NET 202.69.96.226 19.131 ms 18.299 ms 16.819 ms
14 214.217.iconpln.net.id 202.162.217.214 20.386 ms 20.065 ms 19.767 ms
15 www.bmg.go.id 202.69.107.133 37.698 ms 33.952 ms 27.449 ms
the project that due to the remoteness of many sensor stations
and the vulnerability of existing landlines, satellite commu-
nication would be the only viable option to connect the sen-
sors to the central warning center in Jakarta.
3.1 Choice of satellite communication system
Satellite systems may operate without the need for any ﬁxed
terrestrial infrastructure in the coverage area by using on-
board switching and thereby allowing mobile terminals to
directly communicate with each other via the space segment.
A typical example of this type of system is Iridium (see
http://www.iridium.com/). TheIridiumsatelliteconstellation
currently comprises 66 active satellites used for worldwide
voice and data communication, mostly from hand-held satel-
lite phones. These satellites are deployed in six polar low
earth orbital planes at a height of approximately 780km and
communicate with neighboring satellites via Ka band inter-
satellite links to relay communications to and from the ter-
minals. The Iridium system uses these inter-satellite links
to route trafﬁc through space. Each of Iridium’s satellites
maintains links with two to four adjacent satellites, thereby
creating a large mesh network. Hence, trafﬁc from one Irid-
ium terminal to another can be carried entirely through the
space segment. If data needs to be exchanged with hosts that
are not Iridium terminals, one of four earth stations is used
to route into the Internet.
Iridium terminals generally use only low-gain antennas
and do not require pointed parabolic dish antennas. This, of
course was a major design criterion when Iridium was con-
ceivedforprovidingitsmobilephoneservicewithworldwide
coverage. Unfortunately, this comes not without a price:
Firstly, the low earth orbit which results in rather short dis-
tances between satellite and terrestrial terminal and is re-
quired to keep free-space loss low, causes the need for a large
ﬂeet of satellites to provide continuous coverage. This large
ﬂeet is both costly to launch and maintain which results in
high cost for the data trafﬁc that has to be passed on to the
user. Secondly, only very low data rates. Iridium claims data
rates up to 10 kilobits per second for their “direct Internet”
service. Furthermore, this data rate is stated for “compress-
ible” data such as html-ﬁles. Reports are that actual data
rates in the range of two to three kilobits per second are pos-
sible. In consequence, despite its undisputed advantageous
in terms of robustness, Iridium was considered too slow and
forbiddingly expensive for connecting the sensor stations.
Due to the large number of GITEWS sensor stations (see
markers on Fig. 6), their more or less permanent but low rate
data streams and the fact that these stations are not moving,
the use of VSATs (Very Small Aperture Terminals) was con-
sidered a more economical solution. Such VSAT systems use
parabolic “dish” antennas to achieve signiﬁcant antenna gain
and therefore do not require excessive transmission power
despite the fact that the employed satellites are in geostation-
ary orbit. In addition to the remote stations a central hub
station, typically with a larger antenna is required. The oper-
ation of such hub stations is offered by a multitude of opera-
tors that typically pool many such stations on their premises
and connect to their customers’ premises using landline com-
munications. While this service is convenient and would
have relieved the project in terms of the necessary capac-
ity building for operating an own hub on a daily basis, it
was decided to install a dedicated hub at BMKG’s headquar-
ter in Jakarta. The rationale for this choice was that any
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Fig. 6. Remote sensor stations of the GITEWS monitoring network in Indonesia.
other location than the actual warning center would involve
at least two other possible points of failure (the offsite facili-
ties where the hub would be placed and the landline or radio
link between these facilities and the actual warning center)
into the system and therefore make interruptions more likely.
WiththehubatBMKGwewereabletominimizethenumber
of involved components and links in order to minimize the
likelihood of such interruptions. See Fig. 7 for an overview
of all the satellite systems involved in the GITEWS project.
Rain fading problem
A well known issue for satellite communications in tropi-
cal regions like Indonesia is potentially heavy precipitation.
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has cat-
egorized Indonesia as a Region P, which designates coun-
tries with very high rain precipitation. This condition has
to be considered when deciding on the frequency bands to
be used for the VSAT satellite communication links. Com-
mercially available options (terminals and satellite transpon-
ders) are C-Band (4–8GHz) and Ku/Ka (12–18GHz/27–
40GHz, respectively). Generally, rain attenuation increases
with the frequency of the transmitted signal, making C-Band
the standard band for reliable communication in tropic re-
gions. However, the use of the Ku-band for satellite commu-
nications in Indonesia is becoming more frequent. Accord-
ing to Widodo (2005), several satellites (iPSTAR, MEASAT,
Newskies NSS 6) above Indonesia have Ku-band transpon-
ders, and even Ka-band transponders.
Systems using frequencies above 10GHz suffer signiﬁ-
cantly from rain attenuation in terms of availability. This
problem can be mitigated by planning for higher transmis-
sion power to compensate for rain fades. Table 5 gives an
overview of issues considered for deciding the frequency
bandforsensorcommunicationinGITEWS.Consideringthe
extreme importance of the sensors in the warning chain the
project chose the C-Band for achieving maximum availabil-
ity.
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Fig. 7. Three satellite systems are used in GITEWS for different
tasks.
In its current conﬁguration the sensor communication sys-
tem uses 1MHz of leased C-Band transponder bandwidth on
the TELKOM2 satellite (see footprint on Fig. 8). This satel-
lite is positioned on 118◦ East in geostationary orbit and op-
erated by the Indonesian satellite service provider Telkom.
3.2 Allocation of system resources
Based on the actual amount of data transferred to and from
the sensor stations, the bandwidth has been partitioned into
one downstream (250kHz, including inter-carrier spacing)
and three upstreams (250kHz each, incl. inter-carrier spac-
ing).
The subnets with only 250kHz bandwidth allow to use rel-
ativelysmallparabolicantennas(1.8meterdiameter)andlow
power block up converters (2Watt).
The VSAT hardware is a “5IF Hub”, manufactured by VT
iDirect, Incorporated. The iDirect hub was chosen for its
extendibility with additional line cards which will allow ex-
tending the capacity of the system for further cooperation
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Fig. 8. Coverage area (“footprint”) of the Telkom-2 Satellite, which
is used for the sensor network from Maledives to Eastern Indonesia.
with additional partners extending the reach of the system’s
sensors. Furthermore, the system supports Virtual LAN
(VLAN)subnetsforsecurityandbandwidthallocationwhich
is particularly helpful in carrying network trafﬁc of multiple
international partners (China, Germany) and local Indone-
sian authorities (BMKG). In order to prevent the well-known
problem of reduced throughput when TCP (Transport Con-
trol Protocol) is used on links with signiﬁcant delay (the
VSAT system has an inherent roundtrip delay of approx.
0.6s) the iDirect system employs TCP spooﬁng, i.e. sending
“fake” acknowledgement packages to prevent TCP/IP stacks
on the two involved hosts from throttling the data rate. The
system also provides Quality of Service (QoS) control mech-
anisms for prioritizing speciﬁc data streams, such as from the
most relevant sensors. This is particularly useful to avoid de-
laying or loosing such data in link congestions.
3.3 Deployment issues
Since a network of satellite terminals is a highly distributed
andthereforeinherentlycomplexsystemtodeployandsetup,
some initial instabilities occurred and their causes were grad-
ually removed during the initial parts of the learning curve.
As an example, local radio interference was initially sus-
pected of being the cause for instabilities during the initial
setup. However, such local interferences were never veriﬁed
and do not cause any problems, now.
Since March 2007 the system operates in a stable and efﬁ-
cient way. During the three years of operation some weather
outages have occurred. So far, their frequency and durations
are well within expectations.
Since there is typically no air conditioning equipment
available at the sensor stations the equipments is operating
at its temperature limits which may result in accelerated ag-
ing of some components. So far only few defects, but not
necessarily caused by overheating, have occurred. Figures 9
Fig. 9. 4.5m antenna for the VSAT hub system in Jakarta since
2007.
Fig. 10. Remote seismic sensor station with VSAT antenna in Ci-
sompet (south of Bandung, Java).
and 10 show the Hub antenna in Jakarta and a seismic sensor
station with its satellite communication antenna in Cisompet.
Backup communication link
Due to the remoteness of the sensor stations and the difﬁcul-
ties in traveling to them, for example for debugging, it was
considered economic to install additional backup communi-
cation links for maintenance and logging purposes. Among
the options considered was the ACES/PASTI system as well
as Inmarsat BGAN. The use of ACES/PASTI was investi-
gated for its use as backup communication link and initial
tests with hardware were carried out. Due to unsatisfying
dial in performance, potentially due to instable spot beams,
this system was not further integrated in favor of the Inmarsat
BGAN service and terminals (Thrane & Thrane Explorer
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Table 5. Selection of issues considered for deciding the frequency band for sensor communication in GITEWS.
C-Band Ku/Ka-Band
Pros – attenuation caused by rain lower, leading to
higher link availability
– less expensive bandwidth
– smaller antennas
– interference less likely
– less expensive equipment
Cons – frequency region assigned to terrestrial
microwave systems which may cause
interference
– more expensive equipment
– larger antenna required (>=1.8m) which
complicates transportation to remote areas
– potential dropout caused by heavy rain
– more expensive bandwidth
110, formerly NERA Worldpro 1010). It is important to
point out that while using BGAN as the primary communi-
cation means for the sensor stations would have been techni-
cally possible, it would have not been economically feasible.
Using BGAN instead of the VSAT system to transmit the
actual sensor data would have increased the trafﬁc cost ap-
proximately by a factor of 100 for the seismic stations which
generate approximately 10kbit/s of trafﬁc. However, due to
the low amount of data sent by tide gauges (about 150kByte
of uncompressed data per hour), BGAN is used on sensor
stations with tide gauges.
Figure 11 shows the coverage areas of Inmarsat’s three
geostationary satellites and their individual spot beams. It
can be seen that Indonesia and the part of the Indian Ocean
relevant for the GITEWS project, lie well within the area
covered by I-4 Asia Paciﬁc.
3.4 Operational experiences
As stated earlier, satellite communication was chosen due
to the vulnerability of terrestrial infrastructure such as land-
lines. However, an obvious question is whether the direc-
tional antennas of a VSAT-system are vulnerable to an earth-
quake, since their alignment towards the satellite might be
affected by strong ground movement. Without being able
to give a conclusive answer to this question we found the
deployed VSAT-stations (antenna mount and alignment) to
be very robust and, despite being considerably exposed to
ground shaking2, not causing any problems. However, so far
there is not enough evidence to state this as general rule.
The VSAT-based sensor communication system has been
successfully deployed. So far, Germany has installed 30
2Examples are the Bengkulu Earthquake (12 September 2007)
with magnitude 8.0 at 4.57◦ S, 101.34◦ E which did not cause
any interruption to the nearest VSAT Station at Manna (4.4◦ S,
102.9◦ E) at a distance of approx. 150km and the Padang Earth-
quake (30 September 2009) with magnitude 7.7 at 0.78◦ S, 99.87◦ E
which did not cause any interruption at the nearest VSAT Station at
Telukdalam, Nias Island (0.6◦ N, 97.8◦ E) at a distance of approx.
230km.)
Fig. 11. Coverage areas of Inmarsat’s three geostationary satellites
and their individual spot beams. Indonesia and the part of the In-
dian Ocean relevant for the GTEWS project, lie well within the area
covered by I-4 Asia Paciﬁc.
VSATs for connecting the system’s sensors (seismic, GPS,
tide gauges) in three countries. From today’s perspective the
ﬁnal conﬁguration of 35 stations foreseen in GITEWS will
not exceed the system’s capacity. Moreover, China currently
operates 8 seismic stations over the installed VSAT system
and is planning for a ﬁnal conﬁguration of 10. BMKG cur-
rently operates two test stations over the VSAT system for
feasibility checks. One of the two test stations is equipped
with a magnetism sensor. The second test station is equipped
with a lightning sensor. These feasibility checks are carried
out in preparation to a planned installation of a network of
such sensors in the period from 2011 to 2012.
Since April 2009 the VSAT hub is successfully operated
and monitored by local BMKG staff which is considered
to be a further example of successful capacity building in
GITEWS.
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Fig. 12. INTELSAT IS-904, positioned in geostationary orbit at
60◦ East, well between Oberpfaffenhofen (48◦40 N, 11◦160 O) and
Jakarta (6◦110 S, 106◦500 O).
4 Center-to-center communication
Already in the deﬁnition phase of the GITEWS project it had
been planned that the warning system would have to be de-
signed for fully autonomous operation by Indonesian author-
ities. As such, no essential elements of the warning chain
were to be located in Germany. Nevertheless, it was de-
cided that a reliable communication link between the warn-
ing center in Jakarta and the partner institutions in Germany
would be needed for a number of reasons during the installa-
tion phase: ﬁrstly, during the installation phase of the system
software components would have to be deployed, monitored
and debugged. A physical presence of all involved software
developers in Jakarta for every update cycle of the software
was not feasible due to the signiﬁcant amount of travel in-
volved. Secondly, it was considered important to have im-
mediate and detailed information about the system’s status
in the case of signiﬁcant seismic events that were processed
by the system, thereby facilitating rapid analysis of the sys-
tem’s performance by its developers.
Initially, it was not clear whether all sensor data would be
directly delivered to the main warning center at Jakarta, or
if regional warning centers would aggregate and preprocess
sensor data, potentially issuing warning themselves, and for-
ward their ﬁndings to the main warning center.
Conﬁguration of the satellite communication system
For similar reasons already discussed in the previous section
on the sensor communication, a VSAT based communication
system was chosen as the most economic solution that would
guarantee sufﬁcient reliability and ﬂexibility for further ex-
tensions of the system.
Fig. 13. The two VSAT antennas on the roof of BMKG headquar-
ters in Jakarta (top) and on a building of DLR in Oberpfaffenhofen
(bottom).
The chosen hardware (SkyWAN, manufactured by NDSat-
Com) for the two ground stations in Jakarta and Oberpfaffen-
hofen uses QPSK (Quadrature Phase Shift Keying) modula-
tion and a TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) scheme.
Bothstationsareequippedwithﬁxedparabolicantennaswith
a diameter of 3.7m. As the system has to bridge the wide gap
between DLR’s site in Oberpfaffenhofen (48◦40 N, 11◦160 O)
and BMKG in Jakarta (6◦110 S, 106◦500 O) a satellite had to
be found that provides coverage for both locations.
Since a single beam would not be able to cover both loca-
tions with sufﬁcient power density, it is necessary to employ
two beams and to “cross-strap” the corresponding transpon-
ders. The system currently uses INTELSAT IS-904, po-
sitioned in geostationary orbit at 60◦ East (Fig. 12). The
ground stations in Jakarta and Oberpfaffenhofen (Fig. 13)
were installed in early 2008 and have been successfully op-
erated since this time.
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Fig. 14. A mismatch of the affected area with the coverage area of
the communication channel utilized to transport the warning leads
to missed alerts and false alerts.
5 Warning dissemination
It was decided upon the deﬁnition of the GITEWS project,
that the dissemination of the warnings would be ﬁnally left to
Indonesian authorities. However, conceptual work was car-
ried out in order to understand the requirements a dissemina-
tion system would have to fulﬁll and how it would interface
with the rest of the warning system.
Again the guidelines set forth by UN-ISDR provide a good
starting point:
Dissemination and Communication.
“Warnings must reach those at risk. Clear mes-
sages containing simple, useful information are
critical to enable proper responses that will help
safeguard lives and livelihoods. Regional, na-
tional and community level communication sys-
tems must be pre-identiﬁed and appropriate au-
thoritative voices established. The use of multiple
communication channels is necessary to ensure as
many people as possible are warned, to avoid fail-
ure of any one channel, and to reinforce the warn-
ing message”.
“Warning alerts and messages tailored to the spe-
ciﬁc needs of those at risk (e.g. for diverse cul-
tural, social, gender, linguistic and educational
backgrounds). Warning alerts and messages are
geographically-speciﬁc to ensure warnings are
targetedtothoseatriskonly”. (UN-ISDR,2006b).
Following these guidelines, we adopted a human-centered
perspective in our analysis in order to derive requirements.
In general, disasters do not favor certain times of the day.
Hence, we have to be able to warn people whether they are
at home, at work, indoors, outdoors, awake, or asleep. Even
in economically wealthy countries it is extremely difﬁcult to
achieve high penetration rates if users have to procure a dedi-
cated device for receiving warnings. This effect is even more
aggravated in less developed countries. Ideally, devices that
1. User Device “knows” its position
2. Transmit alert + disaster area via all channels
3. Filter and present alert at User Device
Disaster Area
Footprint
A accept alert
A A
B reject alert
B
B


Fig. 15. If a device is capable to determine its location and if the
affected region is encoded and transmitted via multiple communi-
cation channels, missed and false alerts can be avoided.
arealreadydeployedforotherpurposesareemployedforsig-
naling to the user. Users may be in possession or proximity
of analog radio (FM, AM), analog and digital TV (terrestrial,
cable, and satellite), telephones, mobile phones, or comput-
ers connected to the Internet.
Requirements
The impact of a speciﬁc disaster has impact on a geographi-
cally deﬁned region, whereas other regions are not affected.
In order to keep responsiveness to warnings at a high level
it is important to avoid giving false alarms. Accordingly,
warnings have to be limited to affected regions or else they
become false alarms in unaffected regions (see Figs. 14 and
15). Some channels are inherently limited to relatively small
regions (e.g. FM radio), some are not (e.g. Internet access,
satellite TV). In order to be useful for disseminating warn-
ings, a channel has to be able to transport alert messages.
Ideally, a channel is also able to transmit a wake-up signal to
receiving devices.
Anidealdevicewouldbecapabletodetermineitslocation,
either by manual input manual, satellite navigation) in order
ﬁlter alerts based on speciﬁed region and its own location as
well as alert levels before presenting alerts to its user(s).
6 Implementation aspects for data communication
within the central warning center and sensor stations
6.1 Power consumption and supply
The most crucial, yet often difﬁcult prerequisite for reliable
data communication is reliable power supply for all compo-
nents that are involved in the communication chain. While it
is relatively straightforward to install uninterruptible power
supplies (UPS) and backup generators in cities like Jakarta,
this is not always an option at sensor stations that are mostly
located in remote areas.
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Fig. 16. Local infrastructure in the warning center in Jakarta for the
processing systems in the server room.
Due to temporary power cuts and electrical surges that are
common in Jakarta, a UPS is indispensable and needs to be
well dimensioned from the very beginning of the planning.
In consequence, a detailed planning for the power infrastruc-
ture in the server room in Jakarta (see picture on Fig. 16)
was necessary. Network equipment usually does not con-
sume much power (except for combined Power over Ether-
net devices). However, servers can be upgraded at a later
point in time with additional processors, which may increase
their power consumption considerably. This has to be taken
into account for the dimensioning of a UPS – especially con-
cerning hold time of the batteries for a complete shutdown
sequence in case the generator is not able to start.
It is mandatory, that local network devices are available
at any time during an electrical power outage because shut-
down sequences and monitoring commands are mainly sent
over the network. If possible, servers and network should
be connected to independent UPS’s for easier debugging and
management. The use of devices with two power adapters
for redundancy is recommended, too.
While the sensor stations and their measurement equip-
ment are already optimized for low power consumption, the
additional satellite links require a certain minimum power to
reach the satellite at a certain data rate (link budget). The
focus at the remote stations is not to ensure 24/7/365 oper-
ating time – the loss of one or two stations for some days
can be coped with due to the fact that there are many stations
worldwide. Nevertheless, the power budget for an active sta-
tion posed a major problem in the beginning of the project –
especially for the stations that are exclusively solar-battery-
powered like the one in Fig. 17. For details on the imple-
mentation, see the corresponding publication of the seismic
working group. Still, power issues arise in the daily work:
cables are often disconnected by mistake from local people
and batteries need replacement after some years.
Fig. 17. Remote seismic sensor station with solar panels for the
power supply of the sensors, the processing system and the commu-
nication link (Sanana, Moluccas Islands).
6.2 Network health monitoring and backbone
Asthenumberofdevices(stations, serversandnetworkcom-
ponents) rapidly reached a number of 150, it is clear that any
kind of monitoring of the health of the network and devices
is necessary from the beginning and should be continuously
adapted to the changing hardware situations and software
conﬁgurations. This enables to identify bottlenecks caused
by modiﬁed conﬁgurations or ineffective applications.
Additional sensors (temperature, humidity, power con-
sumption) are integrated in the monitoring. Furthermore,
trafﬁc statistics for network equipment are always helpful
for debugging. Our tools of choice are MRTG (http://oss.
oetiker.ch/mrtg/) for network trafﬁc analysis and NAGIOS
(http://www.nagios.org/) for monitoring of device and ser-
vice availability.
Another important component is the routing equipment,
which interconnects several different networks. In GITEWS
like in other complex high availability systems, there are nu-
merous data paths for all the involved systems and we use
several logical networks to separate or combine these data
paths. On the one hand it is important to prevent unautho-
rized access between some networks and on the other hand,
we need a very ﬂexible system concerning network connec-
tivity. Changing parameters like the numbers of stations, the
use of virtual LANs (Local Area Networks) or numerous net-
work ports at the servers require highly ﬂexible routing and
switching hardware at any time of the project.
The work with the data communication infrastructure
showed, that in a rapidly changing complex project environ-
ment with many different sensor systems and server compo-
nents, the requirements cannot be deﬁned at the very begin-
ning. All systems were still under development and had to
be integrated step by step. Interfacing the devices to existing
infrastructure (power and data networks at BMKG Jakarta)
brings up new challenges, daily, further emphasizing the
need for qualiﬁed people on site on a long term basis.
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Fig. 18. Components and interconnections used in the warning system.
7 Conclusions and outlook
During the years 2006–2010 an effective, cost efﬁcient and
sustainable communication infrastructure for a tsunami early
warning system has been conceived, designed and deployed
(see Fig. 18 for a detailed illustration of the components
and interconnections used in GITEWS). This communica-
tion infrastructure encompasses the “convergent” part of sen-
sor communication, a reliable data link between Jakarta
and Oberpfaffenhofen and concepts for the dissemination of
warnings. While the system is fairly large it is still a regional
warning system that – in its current stage – does not fully im-
plement the communication architecture of the generic warn-
ing system described in Sect. 1. Instead, the current com-
munication system implements only the required functional-
ity for the scope of the GITEWS project. Nevertheless, we
strived for a system design and components that are capable
of growing into a more global system with wider geographic
span and potentially more distributed decision processes.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we have mainly discussed
the reasons for using multiple different satellite communica-
tion channels (e.g. backup) in a distributed warning system
and how they were implemented in our special environment.
Ingeneral, today’savailablesatellitecommunicationsystems
are still complex to set up and conﬁgure (especially at the
hub or master station), but very robust to environmental in-
ﬂuences and easy to operate.
Furthermore, we dealt with a range of infrastructure de-
tails, which came up during the process of installation and
testing. Major sources of problems were electrical power
issues – not only at the remote sensor stations. We would
expect similar issues for almost any other similar warning
system with remotely distributed sensor stations or partially
unreliable power distribution grids. In fact, observing power
outages during the installation phase is a good alarm-call to
plan for expected power outages in case of a natural disas-
ter. To address these problems, the use of redundant systems
of any kind (power supply, backup batteries, solar energy,
uninterruptible power supply, backup data links, and more)
is strongly recommended wherever possible. Of course, the
long term stability of the involved components, speciﬁcally
in the light of Indonesian climate conditions still needs to
be proven. Both the importance of the communication sys-
tems in a warning system and the cost and effort involved in
their deployment is easily underestimated (see example on
Fig. 19).
To verify the initial assumptions about data rates and avail-
ability of devices and (satellite) network links, the use of
monitoring tools of any type is recommended from the very
beginning of installation work. We found that often users
and developers are not fully aware of the strong constraints
in satellite bandwidth and the involved cost. Additionally
the best-effort network “internet” may have unpredictable re-
strictions. We found it crucial to clearly communicate these
limitations from the beginning of the overall system design.
This allows software and system developers to take these
limitations into account, minimize data trafﬁc and avoid link
congestion problems a later state.
The daily communication with the partners in Indonesia,
the quick adaptation of required conﬁguration changes, and
prompt troubleshooting not only concerning networks was
alsoomnipresentinourworkandleadtothenecessityofhav-
ing people on site during the whole time of the built-up and
testing phase of the project. The presence of these experts
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Fig. 19. The term “VSAT” (Very Small Aperture Terminal) may
be misleading: considerable logistical effort was involved in the
deployment of both the sensor and center to center communication
links.
can be seen as a key factor for the successful implementa-
tion of a highly distributed and complex system like the one
installed in the GITEWS project. Hence we further recom-
mend to permanently stationing liaison persons with local
authorities for projects of similar scale.
Outlook
For future warning systems that might be conceived and de-
ployed for natural disasters in other regions e.g. in Europe,
it would be desirable to utilize existing infrastructures such
as the public Internet. A detailed analysis of its vulnerability
and resilience to natural disasters would be most valuable.
Where such existing infrastructures prove to be sufﬁciently
reliable, they should be used. For other regions smaller, less
expensive and less power consuming satellite based commu-
nication terminals would be desirable.
We believe that many of the issues we encountered dur-
ing our work in the GITEWS project (German Indonesian
Tsunami Early Warning System) on the design and imple-
mentation communication architecture are relevant for other
types of warning systems. We hope that our work will help
in empowering people in Indonesia to reduce the possibility
of personal injury, loss of life and damage to property and
the environment as well as provide useful insights for the de-
velopment of further worldwide warning systems.
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